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Dicta Observes . .+
AN ALERT BAR

In the issue of Dicta for December an article was published entitled "The Law's Delay". Under this heading, comment was made upon the article and suggestions invited from
members of the bar as to the method of expediting the trial of
cases. The response from the bar was immediate and profuse.
Dicta thanks all members who so kindly cooperated through
letters, personal conferences and telephone messages.
SUGGESTIONS MADE

A digest of the suggestions is as follows:
1. That all motions and demurrers be filed together.
2. That all motions, demurrers and the answer be filed
together.
3. That a reasonable attorney's fee be taxed against the
party filing a frivolous or purely dilatory pleading.
Under suggestion "1" the delay caused by filing a dilatory
demurrer would be gained. Under suggestion "2", it is believed that in most instances the answer would be filed directly and the motions and demurrer filed as a means for delay
would be omitted. Under suggestion "3", counsel would carefully consider his act before filing dilatory pleadings. All
the suggestions made are concerned primarily with the elimination of frivolous and dilatory pleadings that serve no useful
purpose and needlessly consume the time of the Court and
opposing counsel.
EXPEDITING HEARINGS

Dicta is indebted to Carle Whitehead and Albert Vogl
of the Denver Bar, for submitting a plan to have motions,
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demurrers and emergency matters heard very shortly after the
same are filed. The idea suggested shows considerable thought
by its authors and is set out in full in this issue.
MONTHLY MEETINGS

It is to be observed that the monthly meetings of the
association have become unusually well attended. The programs have been interesting, diversified and entertaining.
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

From time to time members of the Bar throughout the
country are solicited to insert their photographs in current
publications. The condition of this privilege requires a cash
payment in the guise of a contribution to defray the cost of the
space used. Dicta has received inquiries concerning the question of ethics, if any, involved in the proposition and submits
in this issue opinion No. 43 of the Committee on Professional
Ethics of the American Bar Association.
UNLAWFUL PRACTICE IN JUSTICE COURTS

The practice of laymen in appearing before the Denver
Justice Courts and acting as counsel is causing much comment
among members of the bar. Although there is no direct statute
opposed to such practice, the layman (acting as an attorney)
states to the Justice he represents his client; when the case is
tried he interposes objections to the admission of evidence and
in all manner and form performs the function of a lawyer.
Dicta has no quarrel with a layman plaintiff or defendant
appearing upon his own behalf; however, as to those purporting to act as counsel, it ought to be within the discretion of the
justice to insist that the party appearing by a representative
be one lawfully entitled to practice the profession. The article
by Max Melville of the Denver Bar upon this subject, published in this issue, is worthy of note.
The Editorial Board of Dicta takes this means of extending greetings of the New Year to all members of the Denver
Bar Association.

JUSTICE COURT PRACTICE BY THE LAITY
By Max D. Melville of the Denver Bar
HE editor of Dicta has asked whether or not persons not
licensed to practice law in Colorado have the right to
appear in behalf of others in justices' courts. The
answer to this depends upon two factors: First, whether practice in such a court is practice of law, and, second, if so,
whether the prohibition against practice by unlicensed persons
is effective only as to practice in courts of record. In the
opinion of the writer, the first question must be answered in
the affirmative, and the second in the negative.
Before proceeding further, it should be said that undoubtedly anyone has the right to appear without an attorney and
prosecute or defend a case in which he has an interest directly
personal to him, whether his appearance be in a court of
record or in justice court; but it should be added that this right
or privilege cannot be claimed either by one who is merely an
assignee for the purpose of suit-such as a bill collector -for
that would be an evasion, or by one who appears purely in a
representative capacity-such as an executor or administrator
-for such a one does not possess the necessary direct personal
interest. In Re Otterness, 232 N. W. (Minn.) 318.
Further, a corporation, whether suing or defending in
behalf of others or of itself, cannot appear in court without
an attorney, for a corporation is incapable of personal appearance in court (Bennie v. Triangle Ranch Co., 73 Colo.
586), and a corporation cannot practice law even though the
actual work is done by licensed attorneys. People v. Painless
Parker,85 Colo. 304; Johnson-Olmstead Co. v. Denver, 1 P.
(2d) 928; Re Otterness, supra; People v. People's Stock Yards
State Bank, 176 N. E. (Ill.) 901.
Seemingly, it cannot seriously be contended that practice
in justice court does not constitute practice of law, even though
within a narrower field than in courts of record. Having
made the world brighter on numerous occasions for spectators,
court attaches, and justices, by falling ignominiously into every
pitfall dug by his legal adversary, no earthly court could convince this writer that such practice is not practice of law, and
a technical one at that.
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However, there is sounder authority to the point. It has
been held recently that one who, though not licensed to practice law, instituted and prosecuted suits before a justice of the
peace was guilty of contempt of the supreme court for intruding into the office of an attorney and pretending to act under
the sanction and authority of such supreme court; and that
this was true even though such intruder told no one that he
was an attorney at law, and even though the justice, sheriff,
and constables with whom he did business knew he was not an
attorney, since, as the court said, the charge was not that he
deceived or defrauded anyone by his unlawful pretensions,
but that he indulged in them. In Re Morse, 98 Vt. 45, 126
Atl. 550.
Assuming, then, that such a one is practicing law, it must
follow that when he holds himself out generally as being willing and qualified to represent the rights of others in justice
courts, he is holding himself out as qualified to practice law
and is thereby deceiving the public; and it must be remembered that the fundamental reason for the licensing of attorneys is for the protection of the public in order that it may not
be imposed upon by the incompetent or unscrupulous. People
v. Alfani, 227 N. Y. 334, 125 N. E. 671.
Does prohibition against unlicensed practice apply only
to practice in courts of record? It is the common impression,
among laymen and lawyers alike, that it does; but, in the
opinion of the writer, this assumption is erroneous and is based
upon a fallacy.
It arises undoubtedly in this way: Sections 5997 and
6017, Compiled Laws of 1921, both refer to practice in courts
of record, and the latter section states that any unlicensed person who advertises, represents, or holds himself out in any
manner as an attorney, attorney at law, or counselor at law,
or who appears on behalf of others in courts of record, shall
be deemed guilty of contempt of the Supreme Court. If that
section is valid, it inferentially would follow that, a justice
court not being a court of record, anyone can practice in such
a court.
The writer believes, however, that the section is a clumsy
attempt to define the practice of law, and also is invalid as an
attempted invasion of the rights of the judicial branch of our
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government in that it assumes to fix the limits of the Supreme
Court's control of the practice of law. It presumes to deprive
the Court of its inherent and plenary power to pass upon the
qualifications of, and to license or refuse to license, those wishing to practice law, and to discipline masqueraders in the ranks
of its officers.
By the Constitution of Colorado the Supreme Court is
given "a general superintending control over all inferior
courts." Art. 6, §2. A justice's court clearly would come
within the category of courts over which the Supreme Court
has such a control, even though it may be debatable Whether
such a court, since the amendment of section I of article 6 in
1912, is still a constitutional tribunal. CourtrightPub. Co. v.
Bray, 67 Colo. 588, 591. And, certainly, the question of who
may practice in these "inferior courts" is an important consideration in the scheme of things.
"True," said Mr. Justice Burke in Kolkman v. People,
89 Colo. 8, 300 Pac. 575, 585, "said 'control' is to be exercised
'under such regulations and limitations as may be prescribed
by law.' But since the two articles must be construed together
the 'law' referred to must not usurp judicial powers. To determine what powers properly belong to the judicial department one must go to the common law."
Going to the common law, we find that it was well settled,
according to the Supreme Court of the United States, "by the
rules of practice of common law courts, that it rests exclusively
with the court to determine who is qualified to become one of
its officers, as an attorney and counselor, and for what cause
he ought to be removed." Ex Parte Secomb, 19 How. 9, 15
L. ed. 565.
In upholding its inherent and exclusive power to control
practice of the law, the supreme court of Wisconsin, in State
v. Cannon, 199 Wis. 401, has put it thus:
"The power to protect courts and the public from the official ministrations of persons unfit to practice in them was fully established in the former
decision of the court in this case (196 Wis. 534), where it was held that when
the people by means of the Constitution established courts, they became endowed with all judicial powers essential to carry out the judicial functions
delegated to them. The courts established by the Constitution have the powers
which are incidental to or which inhere in judicial bodies, unless those powers
are expressly limited by the Constitution. But the Constitution makes no

68

DICTA

attempt to catalogue the powers granted. It is the groundwork upon which
the superstructure of government is raised by the exercise of those powers
which are essential to carry out the functions imposed upon each department
of government. These powers are known as incidental, implied, or inherent
powers, all of which terms are used to describe those powers which must necessarily be used by the various departments of government in order that they
may efficiently perform the functions imposed upon them by the people . . .
When the public framed the constitution creating courts those judicial tribunals were endowed with the inherent power to admit and disbar attorneys-a power which was generally exercised by the courts at the time the constitution was framed and generally recognized as one of the powers essential to the
performance of the judicial duties imposed upon the courts."

Unfortunately, the governor and legislature of Wisconsin
have strenuously doubted the soundness of this position of the
court, for, in 1931, the lawmaking body passed, and the governor approved, an act purporting to restore to Mr. Cannon the
license previously revoked by the court. The outcome of this
conflict remains to be seen, but interesting comments on the
situation will be found in the September and October issues of
the American Bar Association Journal.
Perhaps the most exhaustive historical analysis of the
matter is found in Re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 54 N. E. 646, 50 L. R.

A. 519, decided in 1899. The principles there announced have
recently been reaffirmed by the Illinois supreme court in
People v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 176 N. E. 901,

where it maintained its right to punish unlicensed persons. It
is there said:
"This court has exercised original jurisdiction of applications for admission to the bar of this state and in numerous cases has entertained original proceedings for disbarment. It is argued that this proceeding is not of that
character-that the exercise by this court of original jurisdiction to disbar an
attorney is based upon the fact that the attorney is an officer of the court and
so this court obtains jurisdiction over him by virtue of having licensed him
to practice as such-whereas the court acquires no such jurisdiction with respect to persons who are not so licensed. We believe that such a contention
is entirely untenable. Having inherent and plenary power and original jurisdiction to decide who shall be admitted to practice in this state, and to license
those who may act as attorneys and forbid others who do not measure up to
the standards or come within the provisions of its rules, it necessarily follows
that this court has all the power and jurisdiction necessary to protect and
enforce its rules and decisions in that respect. Having power to determine
who shall and who shall not practice law in this state, and to license those who
may act as attorneys and forbid others who do not measure up to the standards
or come within the provisions of its rules, it necessarily follows that this court
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has the power to enforce its rules and decisions against offenders, even though
they have never been licensed by this court. Of what avail is the power to
license in the absence of power to prevent one not licensed from practicing
as an attorney? In the absence of power to control or punish unauthorized
persons who presume to practice as attorneys and officers of the court, the
power to control admissions to the bar would be nugatory. And so it has been
held that the court, which alone has power to license attorneys, has, as a
necessary corollary, ample implied power to protect this function by punishing
unauthorized persons for usurping the privilege of acting as attorneys. In Re
Morse, 98 Vt. 84, 126 Att. 550."

That the Supreme Court of Colorado considers that it has
exclusive powers with respect to rules of practice and procedure is shown by numerous decisions, the most recent and
most interesting of which is Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo. 8,
300 Pac. 575, in which-although strictly speaking, the legislative enactment was not before it-the court in reality declared unconstitutional the attempt of the legislature, by chapter 132, Sess. L. 1931, amending section 444 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, to nullify Supreme Court Rule 14b, permitting trial judges to comment upon the evidence.
True, two of the justices dissented so vigorously and with
such a violent effect on their brother justices, that if the state
record for concurring and dissenting opinions was not broken,
it was at least crippled; but the unmistakable fact remains that
the Court served notice on the legislature that it would brook
no interference with what it considers its inherent and plenary
rights.
The remaining question to be considered, then, is whether
the Court has manifested in any way that it might overrule any
legislative fiat attempting to give unlicensed persons the right
to practice law in any court over which the Supreme Court has
a superintending control.
The answer is that the Court already has displayed its conviction that it is bound by no statute assuming to give unlicensed persons the privilege of practicing in certain phases
of the work of a court of record. Section 6020 of the Compiled Laws of 1921 reads:
"Nothing in this chapter shall be construed so as to prevent any male
citizen over the age of 21 years, of good moral character, from practicing
as an attorney in the county courts of this state, while sitting for probate
business, without having obtained a license as an attorney as provided herein."
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This statute has been on the books since Colorado attained statehood, and if there were anything to the theory
that, by surrendering for many years to the legislative department a part of its rule-making power, the Court had waived
its right to exercise its inherent powers, certainly here is a
striking example.
A recent investigation demonstrated that, under the foregoing statute, unlicensed persons have been permitted to practice as "probate attorneys" for more than 50 years. Yet, in
1929, the Court adopted Rule 83d, reading: "The present
rules prohibiting the practice of law by those not thereto
licensed shall hereafter apply to practice in probate." And
the significant thing is that the Court did not refer to the
present "statutes" or "laws" relative to unlawful practice, but
referred to the "present rules"-that is, to its own enactments.
And finally, in the opinion of the writer, the Court has
voiced its opinion that it controls practice in justice courts as
fully as in courts of record, and has said in effect, although,
perhaps, not in such unmistakable terms as might be desirable, that none except licensed attorneys may practice before
justices of the peace. Supreme Court Rule 83c, passed in
1929, reads:
"Neither disbarred attorneys nor persons whose applications for examination or admission have been rejected for their failure to show good character,
will be permitted to practice as attorneys in any justice of the peace or other
court in this state."

Manifestly, one whose license has been cancelled, or one
who has been rejected for a license, would not be within the
jurisdiction of the Court if the sole test of that tribunal's right
to regulate practice of the law were whether or not the offender was one of its officers. But, by the foregoing rule the
Court has announced that it will discipline such persons if
they attempt to practice in justice courts.
So, after all, the test must be as to the fitness of the practitioner to be entrusted with the protection of the legal concerns of others; and the only method by which anyone may
have that fitness tested, and his qualifications, moral and educational, approved, is prescribed in detail in 15 pages of the
rules of the Supreme Court.
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Theoretically, at least, any person who has not had the
stamp of approval placed upon his fitness to advise others and
act for them with respect to their legal affairs, must be deemed
conclusively to be unfit; and hence such a one cannot practice
law on behalf of others in any court in this state, whether a
court of record or a justice court, even though, in the words
of Mr. Justice Belford, "his talents may not be inferior to
those of a Webster or a Choate."
The present interest in this subject has arisen because of
the many complaints of abuse of process in justice courts by
collection agencies, whose non-lawyer members prosecute suits
through all stages. Attachment and garnishment writs unquestionably have been converted into bludgeons of oppression
by those agencies. One instance given the writer by one of
the Denver justices showed that in attempting to collect a
$12.50 debt, the collection agent had run four garnishments
within as many weeks, had piled up costs of $17, had extracted
but $8 from the debtor's wages, and had left the debtor, at
the end of the session, owing $12.60, or $9 more than at the
beginning.
And yet, in all fairness, it must be said that unethical
practices in the collection of accounts are not confined to laymen. In the December issue of Dicta was printed an insidious
and slimy "Disclaimer of Liability"-as brazen an instrument as can be imagined-inferentially threatening a debtor
with loss of position and injury to prestige, credit standing,
reputation, and influence. It was signed by the "Legal Division" of a stores company, and that "Legal Division" is a
licensed attorney at law.
We cannot criticize unlicensed practitioners too freely
when our own garments are by no means free of stain. In the
words of the South Dakota supreme court:
"Attorneys should never forget that they are officers of the court; that
justice under the law is all that their clients are entitled to and all that they
have a right to seek for them; that theirs is an honorable profession whose
true votaries never try to justify their acts on the old saw, 'The end justifies
the means.' The collection of claims is a legitimate field of work; but it is a
sad commentary on the legal profession that there are attorneys who are willing
to resort to any and all means to make collections, knowing that there are
many creditors who care little the means that are used by their collectors so
long as the desired end is gained."

A LAWYER'S INTEREST IN PATENTS
By Carlos G. Stratton of the Denver Bar
66SOONER or later every business man is interested in
a patent," is a well known saying. And what is a
business man's interest is a lawyer's business.
To have a working knowledge of patents, a lawyer should
know generally what is patentable, which is very clear when
we are in the field of machinery. Beet harvesters, printing
presses and automobiles are all patentable, if they are new
in a patentable sense. That is easy. However, when we come
to a rubberized glove, an automobile reflector light, or a dandelion digger the way is less clear.
But when we get into the twilight zone, we meet with a
street car transfer (the Denver transfers were patented on
February 18, 1919), a process of recovering precious minerals by the use of certain chemicals or reagents, a cash refund
slip, a combination note and mortgage, a new variety of rose,
a new hair tonic, an attractive radiator cap, or a design for a
ring.
Articles, plants or designs of the above nature have all
been patented, except the combination note and mortgage,
which was expressly held not patentable (Ex parte Dixon,
44 F. (2d) 881). The above list shows the broad field that
is covered by patents.
Many attorneys in the general practice think that when
an article is patented no one may use any of its features. For
instance, suppose a client wants to manufacture a dandelion
digger and he tells his attorney of a competitor's patented
dandelion digger, certain features of which he wants to use.
The problem, of course, is whether he will be infringing by
using those certain features in his dandelion digger.
As technical as this question is, it can be answered quite
positively. The way to avoid infringement of any patent is
to use features of prior patents, or, as usually stated, by using
features that are "old in the art." In answering a question
of this kind, the first thing to do is to obtain a copy of the
competitor's patent. Another thing to do is to get copies of
all the patents cited by the Examiner in the Patent Office during the months, or more probably years, on which the com-
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petitor was trying to get a patent, and determine how broad
the competitor's patent is. It maay be a surprise to learn
that it takes two years and ten months on the average to get
a patent.
As a final step, it is advisable that an infringement search
be made to ascertain whether the client's dandelion digger infringes upon any other patent. It is excellent advice to a
client that he should be quite cautious before entering the
manufacturing field with a new article, on account of the many
fields that are covered by the almost two million United States
patents (a thousand more are issued every week).
Not only the manufacturer, however, needs to fear infringement, but also the seller and the user. A patent is infringed in any one or more of the following three ways: First,
making; second, using; and, third, selling. A question often
asked is, "May I make one just for my own use?"
The answer is, "No." That is none the less an infringement.
It will probably be of value to the attorney in general
practice to know what the stock defenses in an infringement
suit are. They are primarily two, to wit, invalidity of the
patent sued on, by reason of prior patents and/or prior public
use, and, second, that the article in question is not an infringement. These defenses are spoken of as, "Invalidity and noninfringement."
Practically every important invention from barbed wire
(which was important and the patent on which went to the
Supreme Court) to radio tubes has been confronted with the
defense that it was invented at some earlier date by some one
else. There is a psychological reason for this. After a thing
has been in use for a while, the human being, after he has
adopted himself to it, feels as though he has always had it.
As the courts have put it, "It is hard to blaze a trail, but easy
to follow one," and "Problems once solved present no difficulties."
It may of course be that some one did invent it previously.
In this connection, it is interesting to note that it has happened
60,000 times in the history of the United States Patent Office
that two or more people have filed applications on the same
invention. In one case fifty-two people filed applications on
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the same thing. Only the Almighty knows how many people
have independently invented things that were later invented
by some one else, and as to which later inventors reaped the
rewards. Probably every reader of this article can remember
of one or more persons who claim to have invented an important article now in general use, which the world acknowledges
as having been invented by some one else, and for which
that some one else received the financial reward.
The philosophy of the foregoing is this: Human advancement and progress reaches a certain point and there is a need
for a certain improvement. Minds all over the country, yes
all over the world, begin working on the solution and since
no man, nation or race has a monopoly on all the brains, men
at widely different points think of the same solution to the
problem. Some times one inventor accuses another of "stealing" his invention. The fact usually is that neither knew of
the other.
An example may clarify this point. Not many years ago
all radios had three dials and each dial had to be adjusted separately. Since man only has two hands, three dials were inconvenient. The need was seen for a two-dial radio, or, better
still, a one-dial radio. It seems easy now, but there were many
problems to overcome before a commercial one-dial radio
could be put on the market. In the days of three-dial radios,
fifteen inventors, one a Denver man, (fourteen were in the
United States and one in Germany) filed applications within
a span of approximately a year and a half covering the same
way of providing a one-dial radio. Probably none of the
fifteen inventors ever heard of any of the others, so that none
of them "stole" the invention.
The question is asked, "Well, who gets the patent under
such circumstances?" In the first place, it is not a race for
the Patent Office, and, therefore, the first to file an application
for patent is not necessarily the one who is awarded the patent,
although the first to file does have a decided advantage, and
it has been stated that in over 90% of such cases, the first to
file is issued the patent.
The rule very broadly stated is that the first one to "reduce to practice" is awarded the patent. One cannot travel
very far in Patent Law without encountering the phrase
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"Reduction to Practice," which means generally making and
successfully testing the article in question as it was intended
to be used; e. g., if the invention is a gun, it is reduced to
practice by making one and firing it. In lieu of actual reduction to practice, the invention may be constructively reduced
to practice by filing an application for patent.
There is one feature of securing a patent that is not clearly
understood by the attorney in general practice. Probably
99.44% of the applications filed in the Patent Office require
amendment before the patents are issued on same. The word
"amendment", while universally used, is somewhat misleading. Filing amendments really means the prosecution of an
application through the Patent Office, which involves molding and changing the claims which the inventor makes to
cover the invention as broadly as possible and yet not covering what is shown in prior patents, which are cited by the
Examiner.
Here is where the skill and experience of a patent attorney is called into play, for as Rule 17 of the Patent Office
says, "The value of patents depends largely upon the skillful
preparation of the specification and claims."
In other words, a patent is no better than the attorney
who gets it and generally a poor attorney gets a poor patent
and a good attorney gets a good patent. If it were possible
for ten different patent attorneys to obtain a patent on the
same thing, the patents that each would get would be a very
close reflection of the attorneys themselves, their bull-doggedness, their ability and their experience.
In trial work, for instance, a judge might take compassion
upon a young or unskilled counsel and decide the case in favor
of such attorney's client notwithstanding his feeble efforts.
But not so with the Patent Office. The first Commandment
of a patent attorney is, "Ask or it shall not be given thee."

Government is a contrivance of human wisdom to provide for human
wants. Men have a right that wants should be provided for by this wisdom.
-Edmund Burke
Liberty too must be limited in order to be possessed.-Edmund Burke.

A PROPOSED PLAN TO EXPEDITE
BRINGING CASES TO ISSUE*

MY
for
1.

2.
3.

suggestion for more speed and efficiency, and incidentally better pleading, in the civil divisions of the
District Court in Denver, is as follows, to be provided
by appropriate amendment of the District Court rules:
All cases filed shall go to division I which shall be in session at all times to hear and determine all motions, demurrers, applications for injunctions and special proceedings and shall transact all business, except the trial of cases
in which the main issues have been made up, and except
such trials in special proceedings and/or of issues on preliminary matters as the presiding judge may desire to send
to another division.
Divisions 2, 3, 4 and 5 shall sit as trial divisions for the
trial of cases and the trial of such preliminary and special
issues as may be sent by Division I to the other divisions.
Each case, when issues therein are made up, shall automatically be placed on the "Trial List". The 20th of each
calendar month shall be "trial calendar day" in Division I
and on this day the presiding Judge shall call the "trial
list" in the order in which the cases were placed on said
list until sufficient cases are announced "ready for trial"
to fully occupy the trial divisions for the next calendar
month. Any case not ready for trial when it is called on
"trial calendar day" shall automatically go to the foot of
the list unless, for good cause, the presiding judge shall
otherwise rule.
Promptly after "trial calendar day" the clerk of the court
shall print a list of the cases ready for trial during the
next month in the order in which the cases were placed
on the "trial list". On the first court day of the said next
month the presiding judge shall send the first case on the
trial calendar to Division 2, the second case to Division 3,
the third case to Division 4, and the fourth case to Division
5. Thereafter as soon as any division shall have completed
a trial the case then heading the trial calendar shall be
sent to that division for trial and so on till all cases on the
trial calendar shall have been sent to trial divisions or

*The foregoing submitted by Carle Whitehead, Esq., in collaboration with Albert
L Vogl, Esq.
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until the end of the month, if all cases on the trial calendar
be not tried.
Cases on the trial calendar remaining unassigned for trial
at the end of any month shall remain at the head of the
trial calendar for the next month.
4. Either party may notice the other to appear in Division 1,
at an incoming thereof not less than 24 hours from the
service of such notice, to set for hearing any motion or
demurrer, at which time the hearing shall be set for the
earliest date compatible with the business pending in Division 1, provided that where the party filing such motion
or demurrer notices the same for setting the opposing
party shall be given time for preparation which shall be
reasonable in view of the questions involved and the court
engagements of the opposing party.
5. At the request of either party any opinion or remarks made
by the Presiding Judge in ruling upon any motion or
demurrer may be transcribed and placed in the file for the
information of the trial judge. Also the Presiding Judge
may transmit with the files, for the information or assistance of the trial judge, a memorandum of or regarding
the issues, or of or regarding any ruling made during the
making up of the issues. Such order, opinion, remarks
or memorandum may be included in the bill of exceptions
of such trial.
6. The Judge at any time becoming the Presiding Judge
shall remain such to the end of his term of office.
7. Appropriate provisions to be made for:
1. Exchanges of judges between criminal divisions and
civil trial divisions.
2. For special assignment of cases involving prejudice
of or change of venue from the Presiding Judge or
any trial judge.
8. Provisions may be made for imposition of costs and/or
attorney's fees upon the losing party on any motion or
demurrer, if the Presiding Judge shall consider that the
same was filed solely for delay or for other improper
reason.
The foregoing can, undoubtedly, be improved by addition and
modification of detail while preserving the central idea of a
presiding division, always in session for the speedy making up
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of issues, and four trial divisions to be kept substantially
equally busy until trials are up to date.

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
OPINION

43.-(September 17, 1931.)

ADVERTISING-Any payment made by a lawyer for the purpose

of securing the publication of his photograph causes such
publication to become advertising.
PHOTOGRAPHS--Impropriety of paying for their publication,
even though the payment be only for the supposed cost of

some item connected with such publication.
The Sunday edition of a metropolitan newspaper publishes a socalled
"Greater Blanktown" edition, which includes many pages of photographs of
supposed prominent citizens, with a statement under each photograph of the
name and occupation of the person. Each person whose photograph is published agrees to pay therefor a certain definite sum. Contracts for such publication are frequently solicited on the theory that the signers are thus contributing to something of civic benefit though each person whose photograph is
thus published is supposedly "invited" to allow it to be thus used. He is,
nevertheless, required to agree to pay a certain definite sum for such publica-

tion, though this amount is frequently stated to represent only the "cost" of
publication.
A number of members of the Association have asked the committee to
express an opinion as to whether a lawyer may properly furnish his photograph
to a newspaper and agree to pay for having it so published. Other members
have asked whether a lawyer who does not, under such circumstances, agree
to pay for the publication of his photograph, may with propriety agree to
pay the publisher for the supposed "cost" of making the half-tone plate.

The committee's opinion was stated by Mr. Hinkley, Messrs.
Howe, Evans, Harris and Strother concurring as follows:
"A photograph of a lawyer, accompanied by a statement
of his name, address and vocation is not a professional card
and its publication, if paid for by the lawyer, either directly
or indirectly, becomes a solicitation of business by advertising
which must be condemned as a violation of Canon 27. The
attention of the public is drawn in an unusual manner to the
lawyer in connection with his profession. One of the features
which distinguishes an advertisement from a news or literary
article is the fact that its publication is paid for by the one
receiving the benefit of the publicity and the amount of the
payment or what particular item of cost the payment is supposed to cover are immaterial."

JOINT TENANCY IN CORPORATE STOCK
By E. T. Guilford of the Denver Bar

ITH the present-day widespread ownership of corporate stock there is a growing tendency on the part
of shareholders to have stock registered in the names
of joint tenants with right of survivorship.
This is not an article upon the nature, advantages or disadvantages of that method of ownership. It is limited to a
brief consideration of some of the common law characteristics or essentials of such a tenancy and of the possibility that
in some jurisdictions the intention of the parties may be defeated in the attempt to create the estate.
It not infrequently happens that a sole owner of stock
assigns the certificate to himself and another, reciting a joint
tenancy. The question then arisesCan A, sole owner of the stock, without the intervention of a third
party, by assignment to A and B as joint tenants with right of survivorship
and not as tenants in common create in A and B a good estate in joint tenancy.'

It is questionable whether in many of the states which
recognize joint tenancy the estate could be created in the manner indicated, in the absence of enabling statutes.
It is said that in order to have a joint tenancy there must
coexist four unities, namely, unity of title, unity of time, unity
of interest and unity of possession, that is, each of the owners
must have one and the same interest, conveyed by the same act
or instrument, to vest at one and the same time. 2 Blackstone
Comm. 179, 180; 33 C. J. 907. If any one of these elements
is lacking the estate will not be one in joint tenancy. 7 Rul.
Cas. Law, p. 811. Joint tenants cannot acquire under different titles. 2 Blackstone Comm. 181; Thompson on Real
Property, Sec. 1711. "Unity of title" has been defined to
mean that the interests must accrue by one and the same conveyance, and "unity of time" to mean that the interests must
commence at one and the same time. Staples v. Berry, 85
Atl. (Me.) 303. (Accurately, there are some exceptions to
the rule that joint tenants must acquire their estates at one
and the same time. Freeman, Cotenancy & Partition (2d
ed.) Sec. 11. Freeman continues: "But there seems to be
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no exception to the rule that the title of joint tenants must
arise from one act, deed or devise." See Thompson on Real
Property, Sec. 1711; Edwards' Property in Lands, 155). Personalty may be held in joint tenancy. Miller v. American
Bank & Trust Co., 71 Colo. 346; Erwin v. Felter, 119 N. E.
(Ill.) 926; Burns v. Nolette, 144 Atl. (N.H.) 848. It may
be stated as a general rule that shares of stock in an incorporated. company are personal property. Fletcher's Cyc.
Corporations, Sec. 3429; Anderson, Limitations of the Corporate Entity, Sec. 491a, and note.
While strictly speaking, a tenancy by the entirety is not a
joint tenancy (Stelz v. Shreck, 128 N. Y. 263), the unities of
title, time, interest and possession are common to both estates.
13 Rul. Cas. Law, p. 1098. It therefore seems that the cases
hereinafter mentioned dealing with the creation of estates of
entirety, insofar as the unities of title and of time are concerned, are applicable to joint tenancies.
The question was before the Court in Breitenbach v.
Schoen, 198 N. W. (Wis.) 622, where a mother owning certain certificates of stock assigned them to herself and her son
indicating an intention to create a joint tenancy. A controversy arose between the executrix of the mother's estate and
the son as to the ownership of the shares. It was held that a
joint tenancy was not created, the Court saying:
"Manifestly, the deceased could not convey an interest in the certificates
to herself, and it is quite clear that she did not intend to convey the entire
interest in the certificates to her son. Not being able to make a conveyance
to herself there was neither unity of title nor unity of time and under such
circumstances a tenancy in common was created rather than a joint tenancy.
There was therefore no right of survivorship as to the four certificates assigned."

The Court in Staples v. Berry, supra, in referring to the
four unities of joint tenancy, said:
"This would seem to contemplate conveyance or devise by A., the sole
owner, to B. and C. as joint tenants, not as splitting up of A's ownership so
that B. becomes a joint tenant with A."

In Wright v. Knapp, 150 N. W. (Mich.) 315, a husband
attempted to convey his homestead to himself and his wife by
a deed containing the following:
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"Between William Wright, of the township of North Plains in Ionia
County, and State of Michigan, of the first part, and William Wright and
Elizabeth Wright, jointly, the survivor to have full ownership of the same
place, of the second part",

The Court held that upon the death of the husband the
wife took the entire estate, basing its decision upon the ground
that a grantor cannot convey directly to himself, and applying the rule that where one of several grantees, for any reason, is incapable of taking, the other grantees capable of taking shall take the whole. The grantor named as grantee was
considered surplusage. The Court said that the intention of
the husband to create an estate in himself and wife by the entireties could not be questioned but that it was unnecessary to
determine whether such an estate could be created by the instrument under consideration. It is significant to note that
in the dissenting opinion of Bird, J., five judges concurring,
on the ground that the deed created a tenancy in common, it
was said that an attempt was undoubtedly made to create an
estate in entirety but it failed "because the formalities of the
law were not observed in its creation", and also that an estate
in joint tenancy was not created.
In Deslauriersv. Senesac, 163 N. E. (Ill.) 327, 62 ALR
511, Ida Deslauriers in 1903 acquired title to certain real estate. Subsequently she married Homer Deslauriers. In 1911
the husband and wife executed a warranty deed purporting
to convey the property to themselves as joint tenants and not
as tenants in common. The description was followed by the
statement: "Said grantors intend and declare that their title
shall and does hereby pass to grantees not in tenancy in common but in joint tenancy." The Court held that a person
cannot convey or deliver to himself that which he already
possesses; that he cannot by deed convey an estate to himself
or take an estate from himself, and that joint tenancy requires
that the tenants have one and the same interest accruing by
one and the same conveyance, commencing at one and the
same time, and that the interests of the wife and her husband
were neither acquired by one and the same conveyance nor
did they vest at one and the same time. The Court said:
"Two of the essential properties of a joint estate-the unity of title and
the unity of time-were therefore lacking. Where two or more persons ac-
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quire individual interests in a parcel of property by different conveyances and
at different times, there is neither unity of title nor unity of time, and in such
a situation a tenancy in common, and not a joint tenancy is created." (Citing
Breitenbach v. Schoen, supra; Green v. Cannady, 57 S. E. (S.C.) 832; 7 Rul.

Cas. Law, p. 811).

It was contended in this case that effect should be given
to the intention of the grantors to create a joint tenancy as expressed in the deed, and on this point the Court said:
"It was clearly the intention of the grantors to convey an estate in joint
tenancy. The intention of the parties to a deed will be given effect, if it can
be done consistently with the rules of law. * * * It was not for failure to ascertain the intention of the grantors that the grantees did not take title in a
joint tenancy, but because, under the law a joint tenancy could not be created
in the manner which was here attempted. * * * Ida Deslauriers failed to convey any interest to herself as a joint tenant, and for that reason she also failed
to convey to her husband in joint tenancy."

In Michigan State Bank v. Kern, 155 N. W. (Mich.)
502, Kern conveyed land to himself and wife. This was held
to be a tenancy in common and not one by the entirety.
The law now appears to be settled in New York that a
husband may by conveyance to himself and wife create a tenancy by entirety, reserving the same rights he would have under deed from another. Boehringer v. Schmid, 133 Misc.
236, 232 N. Y. Supp. 360, affirmed by the Court of Appeals
in 173 N. E. 220. The same view appears to be held in Oregon. In Dutton v. Buckley, 242 Pac. (Ore.) 626, 62 ALR
514, note, it was held that where a husband who was the sole
owner of land conveyed it to himself and wife, the wife joining in the conveyance, and it appeared that the intention of
the parties to the deed was to create such an estate in the land
that the survivor would take the whole estate in fee, effect
would be given to the intent of the parties. In Burns v. Nolette, supra, it is said: "A conveyance of personal property
should be given the effect intended by the parties."
In In Re Horler's Estate, 168 N. Y. Supp. 221, a wife by
deed granted and released to her husband an undivided half
interest in certain land and immediately after the description
recited:
"It being the intention of the party of the first part to transfer and con-

vey to the party of the second part an undivided one-half interest and estate
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in the aforesaid parcel of land and the improvements thereon, but so that the
party of the first part and the party of the second part shall hold and own the
same as joint tenants and not as tenants in common, and so that the survivor
shall have and take the absolute title and ownership in and to the same in fee
simple absolute."

The Court after stating that unity of title means that the
estate of joint tenancy must be created by the same act or instrument, said:
"The comptroller asserts that the wife derived her title from her grantor, and the husband derived his from his wife, and therefore there was no
unity of title. But it is the unity of title in the joint tenancy with which we
are concerned. Therefore, if the wife, as holder of the fee to the entire property, could by a deed to her husband, without the intervention of a third party,
create in her husband and heirs a joint estate, there would be unity of title
and of time, for the estate would be created at one and the same time by one
instrument. * * * It is commonly recognized that as to personalty a joint
tenancy may be created in husband and wife by assignment executed by the
one having the entire interest to husband and wife jointly, and that in such
case the four unities are present. In re Dalsimer Estate, 167 App. Div. 365,
153 N. Y. Supp. 58. So far, therefore, as concerns unity of title and time,
both exist where the joint estate is created by the deed of husband or wife,
owner of the fee, to the other directly."

In In re Klatzl's Estate, 110 N. E. (N.Y.) 180, Chief
Justice Bartlett said, concerning the effect of a deed by husband to wife which in his opinion and that of three other
judges created a tenancy by the entirety:
"I see no reason why the husband could not convey to his wife such an
estate as she would get by a similar deed to them from a third person, and at
the same time reserve for himself the same rights he would have under such
a deed. Even if the deed created a mere joint tenancy it would be good."

In the Boehringer case, supra, as reported in 232 N. Y.
Supp. 360, and affirmed, in answering the contention that the
deed of Schmid to himself and wife created a tenancy in
common because lacking the necessary elements of a joint
tenancy, the Court said:
"This contention rests upon the erroneous premise that the original title
or interest of the husband remained in him after the giving of his own deed,
while the wife's title, coming to her by that deed, created an estate in which
there did not exist a unity of title and time at least. On the contrary, the
ownership, title, and interest devolved upon both husband and wife as one
person at the same time by virtue of his deed. Each was seized of a whole
and not a separate part and there was, therefore, unity of title, interest, time,
and possession."
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A surviving joint tenant always takes by p'irchase, never
by descent, and holds the whole property under and by virtue
of the originalgrant or conveyance to the joint tenants. Babbitt v. Babbitt, 41 N. J. Eq. 392. The cases are in agreement
as to the necessity of the four unities and that joint tenants
must take at one and the same time and by the same act or
instrument, but appear to differ upon the question as to what
constitutes unity of title. Observe the different views held in
the Breitenbach case and In re Horler's Estate. The former
apparently proceeds on the theory that the conveyance by the
sole owner to herself and another with the expressed intention of creating the estate did not change the nature of the
ownership theretofore held, notwithstanding the intention to
initiate in the grantor a new kind of title. In the latter, the
wife's deed constituted the original grant or conveyance to
the joint tenants, transforming the wife's sole ownership into
a new kind of estate, so that she thereafter held in a different
capacity and in that sense the transaction might be distinguishable from the case of one conveying to oneself. The difference seems to result from the application of different rules of
construction and greater readiness on the part of some courts
to give effect to the expressed intention of the parties. Compare the Deslauriers and Dutton cases.
That joint tenancy with its right of survivorship is held
in high disfavor in many states, see Simons v. McLain, 32
Pac. (Kan.) 919. The possibilities of injustice inherent in
the estate have illustration in the case of Fleming v. Fleming,
174 N. W. (Ia.) 946.
It would seem that one contemplating the crleation of
such an estate, in a jurisdiction where recognized and unmodified by statute, would do well to reflect that its characteristic principles, feudalistic in origin, remain.
Bad laws are the worst sort of tyranny.-Edmund Burke.
Government is a contrivance of human wisdom.-Edmund Burke.
Then too in law there are a thousand causes of disgust, a thousand delays to be endured.-Juvenal.

k.q

+..Dictaphun +++
DICTAPHUN OBSERVES
That in IX DICTA 3 the Editors announced that "Dicta will hereafter contain an editorial page under the title of 'Dicta Observes.' Items of
interest will be noted, recommendations will be urged and suggestions made."
That in the two issues perpetrated on the world since the announcement
of that department, it has called attention to the following items of interest,
urged the following recommendations and made the following suggestions:
1. It hails the admission of 31 more lawyers.
2. It cites Will Shafroth and Harrie M. Humphreys to show that
there are two times too many lawyers already.
3. It feels that candidates for admission to the bar have to wait too
long for their grades.

4. It suggests serious consideration of pensions for aged lawyers.
5. It agrees with a contributor, Bentley M. McMullin, that 300 days
is too long a time to spend in getting a judgment in the District Court.
6. It denounces the filing of dilatory motions.
7. It congratulates the Judges of the Denver District Court for following their own rules.

DICTAPHUN OBSERVES SOME MORE
In IX DICTA 50, we read that Benjamin Franklin Hall, First Chief
Justice of Colorado, wrote no opinions during his tenure.
In IX DICTA 38 the weighty problem of the right of an attorney who
appears pro se to get judgment for the fee provided in a note is discussed but

not decided.
If IX DICTA 3 is compared with IX DICTA 26 the veracity of the
Editor-in-Chief and of the Editor of Dictaphun challenges investigation. For
one the Editor of Dictaphun will stand on what is left of his constitutional
rights.

DICTAPHUN CONTINUES TO OBSERVE
That the practice of the Editor-in-Chief and his two deputies in using
fillers where an article or department is not sufficient to complete a page may
become dangerous. For example (e. g. to us), in the December issue of this
lawyer's beacon and housewife's guide Dictaphun ended in the middle of page
54. The filler immediately following was not a part of this department and
although we reprint it here we disclaim any thought that it should have been
included. Here it is:
"Laws were devised for the safety of citizens and the preservation of
states.-Cicero."
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WHAT SENATOR CICERO HAD IN MIND
Chapter 153, S. L. 1931, making calamospiza melancorys steineger the

state bird.
Chapter 118, idem, fixing liability in damages upon a motorist when an
"accident shall have been intentional" on his part.
Chapter 75, idem, establishing Costilla as a fourth class county for its
judge, and giving him a fifth class clerk.
Chapter 60, idem, allowing Recorders fifty cents for filing chattel
mortgages, followed by the solemn phrases of the safety clutch, to-wit: "Section 2. It is hereby declared that this act is necessary for the immediate
preservation of the public peace, health and safety;" and adding the emergency clause.
Chapter 59, idem, calling down the wrath of the sovereign people upon
any person who shall "kill for his . . . own use and consumption (sic), any
beef . . .without preserving the hide of such animal intact, with a complete

unskinned tail attached thereto."
Chapter 161, idem. Q. v.

THE LEGISLATURE GOES DOWN TO
THE SEA IN SHIPS
Senate Joint Resolution No. 13 (S.L. 1931, p. 875) commends the
President of the United States for his efforts to open the St. Lawrence waterway, and stresses its importance to "this section of landlocked country."

A LETTER WRITTEN BY S. D. CRUMP
The recent death of Sam D. Crump recalls to memory the letter he
addressed to his Colorado friends when he removed to Nevada, in 1906. The
letter, as reported in 10 Law Notes 219, follows:
"To my Colorado Friends:
"Ely, Nevada, December 15, 1906.
"I wish to announce that I have removed my law office to this city. I
don't know my street or number or which side of the street it is on, because
I am still 'turned around.' But am in suite 23, just around the corner from
the 'Palm' which is immediately across from the 'Palace' whence the 'Capitol'
(owned by Tex Rickard) -bears toward Poker Pete's place a few hundred feet.
The sign will be up as soon as the artist gets his materials.
"If you can't find the office by these directions inquire of Piute Joe's
s4uaw, Casino, who has promised to build my fires. She stands opposite Billy
Root's print shop. Am not yet admitted to practice in all courts of the State,
but will be, as a young lawyer from Utah encouragingly told me 'It didn't
take much to get a license out here.' But I have a lovely certificate of
character from Judge Gabbert (for use only in Nevada) which the J. P. here
says will do for a while.
"Respectfully,

"Sam D. Crump."
"P. S.-If Casino should be drunk, see Lee Glockner.

COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(EDIToR's NorF-It is intended to print brief abstracts of the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the issue of Dicta next appearing after the rendition thereof. In the
event of the filing of a petition for rehearing, resulting in any change or modification
of opinion, such will be indicated in later digests.)

OF WILLS-In the Matter of the Estate
of Edgar B. Gardner, Deceased, et al. v. The International Trust Company, et al.-No. 12897-Decided October 26, 1931-Mr. Justice Burke
delivered the opinion of the Court.

WILLS-TRuSTS-CONSTRUCTION

1. Where a mother created a trust providing that the income therefrom
should be paid to her son during his lifetime, and that he should have power
to dispose of the corpus by will, and the son died leaving a will, which, after
providing for the payment of debts and certain legacies, conveyed the residue
in trust for his daughter, and he left an excess of debts over assets, the lower
court was right in ordering that after the exhaustion of decedent's unbequeathed personal property, the unpaid portion of the debts should be satisfied out of the trust fund created by the mother.
2. Where there is an express intent in a will to exempt the trust estate
from the payment of debts and legacies, or the will is silent, or uncertain on
that subject, the trust estate will not be liable for the debts and legacies.
3. Where testator includes the entire trust estate in the description of
the balance, residue, and remainder, and where he also includes in the balance
and remainder all the property and estate over which he had the power of
disposition by willl, and provides generally for the payment of debts and provides specifically for the payment of taxes out of his gross estate, the will
should be construed on the theory that his personal property and the corpus
of the trust estate were considered by him as a single fund for all the purposes
of the will.
4. Where, without resort to the corpus of the trust, a testator left no
estate from which his debts could be paid nor anything out of which legacies
could be paid, and there is nothing to indicate that he was not fully cognizant
of this fact, and yet specifically provides for the payment of debts and legacies,
there was an express intention on his part from the terms of the will not to
exempt the trust estate from the payment thereof.
5.

Since a will takes effect only at death, it generally speaks from that

date.
6. Where a testator uses the language above set forth, even though the
will was executed three years prior to decease, the testator could by no reasonable construction have in mind debts existing at the date of the will, but
on the contrary, must have contemplated debts existing at his death.-Judgment affirmed.
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National Surety Company v. The Denver Sewer Pipe & Clay Co.-No.
12490-Decided November 2, 1931-Mr. Justice Campbell delivered the
opinion of the Court.

1. Where suit is instituted against a construction company and against
a surety company, which had, in its surety contract, made itself liable for labor
and materials used or performed in the prosecution of the work provided for
in the construction contract, and where the question was raised as to whether
or not the articles sold by the plaintiff were used in the construction in question, and where the uncontradicted testimony disclosed that one of plaintiff's
employees saw some, but not all, of the materials in question being used in
the construction, this evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie case by
the plaintiff.-Judgment affirmed.
APPEAL AND ERROR-QUESTIONS TO BE DECIDED BY-FINAL ORDERS ONLY

WRITS-Boxwell v. The Greeley Union National Bank-No.
12483-Decided November 2, 1931-Mr. Justice Campbell delivered the
opinion of the Court.

REPEATED

1. Matters will not be determined upon a Writ of Error when the determination thereof does not constitute a final judgment.
2. Where plaintiff's complaint alleges fraud upon the part of one defendant, and further alleges that the other defendant, the Bank, received from
the defendant, moneys, which, in equity, belong to the plaintiff, being part
of the money of which plaintiff had been defrauded, and of which fraud the
Bank was aware, and where demurrers to the complaint of the other defendants were overruled and the demurrer of the Bank to the complaint was
sustained, the upholding of the Bank's demurrer is not properly subject to a
Writ of Error because the order was not a final judgment, but was interlocutory.
3. For a judgment to be final, it must end the particular suit in which
it was entered. It should not leave undecided issues.
4. The Supreme Court has inherent authority to regulate its jurisdiction so as to prevent successive appeals from a judgment.-Writ of Error
dismissed.
DIVORCE-CUSTODY

OF CHILD-DISTRICT COURT, JURISDICTION OF-JUV-

ENILE COURT, JURISDICTION

oF-Georgia Orahood Ross v. John Chaf-

fee Ross-No. 12448-Decided November 2, 1931-Mr. Justice Butler
delivered the opinion of the Court.

1. Where, in a divorce suit, the mother is awarded custody of a child
by the District Court and where subsequently, the child's grandfather and
father petition the Juvenile Court to have the child declared a dependent,
and where the father petitions the District Court for modification of the
divorce decree so as to award his parents the custody of the child, the District
Court is not divested of jurisdiction by the institution of the proceedings in
the Juvenile Court.
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2. The jurisdiction of the divorce court is exercised merely between the
husband and wife, while the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court is exercised
"as between the state, or, so to speak, the child, and the parents of the child".
3. Contention that the father by electing to intervene in the dependency
proceedings was barred from seeking relief in the District Court, the doctrine
of election of remedies is not applicable.
4. Ordinarily, a custody order should be modified only when there has
been a subsequent change of conditions, or a discovery of material facts formerely unknown. However, under some circumstances, the Court may consider evidence introduced prior to the decree.-Judgment affirmed.
WATER RIGHTS-ADJUDICATION OF-FINDINGS OF FACT-CONTRACTSINTERPRETATION-WATER DEE]--Caldwell, et al. v. States-No.12379
-Decided November 2, 1931-Mr. Justice Butler delivered the opinion
of the Court.

1. Where the findings of fact, by the trial court, are supported by a
preponderance of the evidence, they will not be disturbed upon appeal.
2. It is the duty of the court, where the language of a contract is indefinite or ambiguous, to adopt the construction and particular interpretation,
which the parties themselves have put upon it and to enforce that construction.
3. A water adjudication settles priority of rights as between two ditches,
but it cannot adjudge the respective rights and claims of water users under
either ditch.
4. Where a deed conveys land "together with all water rights, including
all of first party's interest in and to the Japan ditch and its water rights and
priorities and 200 shares of capital stock of Rockland Reservoir Company,
and all other water rights which have been and are used for irrigation of
above described land and for the irrigation of any part thereof", such deed
carried all water rights.-Judgment affirmed.

JUSTICE COURT JUDGMENTS-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AGAINST-The
New England Electric Company v. Willis Bowes-No. 12533-Decided
November 2, 1931-mr. Justice Moore delivered the opinion of the Court.
1. Where, nine years subsequent to obtaining a judgment in Justice
Court, a transcript thereof was filed in the District Court and execution and
levy made thereon, a motion to vacate the judgment as being barred by the
statute of limitations is properly upheld.
2. The statute of limitations, providing that action shall be instituted
within six years unless "he is out of the State * * * and if, after the cause of
action accrues, he depart from the State * * * the time of his absence or concealment shall not be computed as part of the period within which the action

must be brought", does not apply to judgments already obtained in the Justice Court.
3. After a lapse of six years, a Justice Court judgment is dead.-Judgment affirmed.

90

DICTA

oF-L. L. Stonebraker v. The People of
the State of Colorado-No. 12917-Decided November 2, 1931-Mr.
Justice Hilliard delivered the opinion of the Court.

CRIMES-PERJURY--ELEMENTS

1. "Perjury is wilfully and corruptly swearing falsely to a matter material to the issue or point in question."
2. Where defendant was convicted of perjury and there is an entire
lack of testimony to show the materiality of the alleged perjured evidence,
the conviction cannot be sustained.
3. Where the defendant was sued in a civil action for injury to plaintiff's reputation and credit, by virtue of the defendant's having cancelled
certain policies of insurance of the plaintiff and where the testimony which
was alleged to have been perjured was not shown to relate to policies in dispute, no conviction of perjury would lie.-Judgment reversed.
WILLS AND A.DMINISTRATION-ESTATES--WIDOW'S

ALLOWANCES-CLASS

OF CLAIM-Mary Eisenberg v. Edna D. M. Reininger-No. 12932-Deeided November 2, 1931-Mr. Justice Moore delivered the opinion of
the Court.
1. Where the statute provides that expenses of administration and settlement of the estate shall comprise second class claims and all allowances to
the widow, wife or orphan shall compose the fourth class claims, a claim of
the second class takes precedence over a widow's allowance which is a demand
of the fourth class.-Judgment reversed and remanded.
CRIMINAL LAW-CHANGE OF VENUE-ADMISSION OF TESTIMONY-INSTRUCTIONS-SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE-Gould vs. The People-

No. 12849-Decided November 9, 1931.-Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
1. Defendant below was found guilty of murder in the first degree,
and sentenced to life imprisonment. The evidence was wholly circumstantial.
The defendant did not take the stand and explain away any of the incriminating circumstances, and the sufficiency of the evidence was a matter for the
jury.
2. Where defendant fails to take advantage of his right to explain
away circumstantial evidence, which might be construed to indicate his guilt
of the charge, he cannot complain that the jurors drew inferences warranted
by the evidence.
3. A change of venue of the place of trial is ordinarily within the
discretion of the trial court, and where no abuse appears, the trial court's
ruling will not be disturbed.
4. Objections to circumstantial evidence on the ground that it is indefinite, uncertain and inconclusive is not well taken for its weight is a question
for the jury.
5. Failure of the Court to give requested instruction to acquit the
defendant if the evidence as a whole raises only a suspicion of guilt is not
error where the court gives another instruction covering reasonable doubt.Judgment a/firmed.
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MECHANIC'S LIEN-ARcHITECTS' LIEN-SUBSTITUTION OF PLANS-PARTIAL USE OF ORIGINAL PLANS-WHEN FILED AND WHEN FORECLOSED-

The Park Lane Properties,Inc., et at., vs. W. E. Fisher,et al.-No. 12589
-Decided November 9, 1931-Opinion by Mr. Justice Moore.
1. Where an architect furnishes plans for the erection of a building,
and where his services are later dispensed with and the building is built under
plans of subsequent architect, but the essential features of the original plans
are embodied in and used in the construction of the building, the architect has
a lien against the real estate and the structure thereon for his services.
2. An architect has three months after the completion of the building
to file his lien statement and has six months after completion in which to
institute suit.
3. An architect's lien is prior to that of a first deed of trust where the
architect's services were commenced prior thereto.-Judgment a/firmed.
IRRIGATION

DISTRICTS-ELECTIONS

IN-CONTESTS

OF-People Ex Rel

Shaklee vs. Milan-No. 12678-Decided November 9, 1931-Opinion by
Mr. Justice Alter.
I. Tenants in common, under a statute permitting owners of horticultural or agricultural lands to vote in an irrigation district election, are entitled
to vote. Tenants in common hold several and distinct titles with unity of
possession.
II. Those holding contracts for the purchase of real estate are not
owners within the purview of the statute and cannot vote.
III. When it is provided that persons, paying taxes on real property
during the calendar year preceding the election, shall have the right to vote,
the calendar period so designated means the period from January 1 to December 31 preceding the election.
IV. A voter otherwise qualified must vote in the proper precinct or
his vote will be invalid.
V. Owners of town lots with garden plots thereon are not, under
the statute, permitted to vote.-Judgment reversed.

MUNICIPAL

CORPORATIONS -

CHARTERS-

CONSTRUCTION

OF -

PAVING

DISTRICTS-Miller vs. Denver-No. 12425-Decided November 16, 1931
-Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
I. Where the Municipal Charter provides that, except on petition, no
paving district shall include more than twelve blocks, the fact that the district
includes eleven blocks, and the strip in question was not platted, would not
be a violation of the Charter so long as the unplatted parcel, considering area,
would not exceed twelve blocks when added to the platted parcel. There is
compliance with the Charter provision.
II. When the Manager of Parks and Improvements obeys the provisions of the Charter, his acts will not be deemed legislative.
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III. Notice given fifty-eight days within which property owners may
object is not good when the Charter provides that property owners may introduce their objections at any time within sixty days after the first publication
of notice.
IV. When the Manager of Parks and Improvements did not complete
a paving project in accordance with the ordinance giving him authority to act,
the Charter rights of the plaintiff were ignored and the assessment levy on
his lots was void.-Judgment reversed.

MUNICIPAL

CORPORATIONS-FIRE

DEPARTMENTs-LIABILITY

FoR-NEG-

LIGENCE OF-Moses v. City and County of Denver-No. 12516-Decided
November 16, 1931-Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.
I. When a Municipal Corporation is not liable for acts of negligence
committed by its employees in the exercise of its governmental functions.
II. The maintenance of a Fire Department by a Municipality is a
governmental function.
III. The City is not liable for injuries to persons caused by the negligence of employees of the Fire Department while such employees are pursuing
their duties.-Judgment affirmed.
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